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Abstract: Based on a Multi-Regional Input-Output (MRIO) model, and combined with the 2012 
MRIO table for 30 Chinese provinces, this paper analyzes the distributional impacts of carbon 
pricing on households within and across Chinese provinces. The results show regressive 
distributional effects of carbon pricing across provinces, i.e. poor provinces are affected more by 
the price. Carbon pricing also shows rural-urban regressivity (i.e. rural households are impacted 
more heavily than urban households) in more than half of the provinces. Within each selected 
province, carbon pricing has mostly regressive effects, i.e. poorer households groups are affected 
more than richer groups for urban households in all provinces and for rural houeholds in one 
third of the provinces. When looking more specifically at direct energy consumption, we find 
that the carbon pricing on domestic fuels generally shows regressivity, while pricing carbon on 
transport fuels shows progressivity. In addition, the impact of carbon pricing on residence 
(mainly on electricity and coal) is the most important contributor to the regional regressivity 
across provinces. 
Keywords: Carbon pricing; carbon tax; income distribution; inequality; climate change; 
Input-output analysis  
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1. Introduction 
China has experienced fast economic growth with a rapid increase of energy consumption 
and CO2 emissions over the past four decades (Feng et al., 2013). At the same time, its carbon 
intensity is still much larger than the carbon intensity of developed countries and the world 
average, due to large share of coal in China’s energy mix (Minx et al., 2011). Moreover, when 
comparing per capita GDP across 31 provinces in 2017 (see Appendix Fig. A.1), China has 
significant income differences between provinces, in particular a big gap between coastal and 
inland provinces; in addition, China’s urban-rural dual economic structure leads to pronounced 
inequality between rural and urban households. According to China Statistical Yearbook 2018 
(NBS, 2018), in 2017, the average per capita disposable income of urban households was 36.4 
thousand Yuan, while the average per capita disposable income of rural households was only 
about a third with 13.4 thousand Yuan. Moreover, the urban-rural gap shows significant 
differences across provinces. For example, in 2017, the per capita disposable income of Tianjin’s 
urban residents was 1.85 times of its rural residents while the figure in Gansu was about 3.44 
times.  
These issues constitute a complex situation with potentially contradictory goals for the 
Chinese government, which, on one hand strives to maintain economic growth and mitigate the 
regional imbalance and income disparity, and on the other hand, attempts to realize energy 
conservation and emissions reduction to address climate change. To address climate change, the 
Chinese government has announced a series of emission reduction targets and declared the 
implementation of climate mitigation policies, such as carbon pricing to realize these targets. For 
example, China pledged to peak its CO2 emissions around the year 2030 and potentially before 
that, and to reduce its carbon intensity by 60%-65% from the levels in 2005. To achieve its 
carbon pricing policy, China established seven pilot carbon markets in five cities and two 
provinces from 2013 to 2014, and launched the national carbon market for power generation 
industry in December 19, 2017
1
; in addition, a carbon tax policy also is planned to come into 
effect as a complement to the carbon market after 2020
2
. Many economists and scholars support 
the implementation of the carbon tax in China due to its simplicity and transparency (Feng et al., 
2010; Liang and Wei, 2012). 
However, the implementation of carbon pricing may cause negative distributional effects. 
Due to differences in income and consumption patterns, different households groups would be 
impacted differently to the same stimuli. The concern that the carbon burden will fall more 
heavily on the poor is seen as a major obstacle to its policy acceptability because poor people 
often spend a larger share of income on energy-intensive products to meet their basic needs (e.g. 
                                                             
1 People's Daily Online. National Development and Reform Commission: China has officially launched the 
national carbon emissions trading system. 2017-12-19. Available from: 
http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1219/c1004-29716952.html. 
2 China Development. Is the carbon tax really coming? 2017-10-28. Available from: 
http://www.chinadevelopment.com.cn/news/ny/2016/10/1092535.shtml 
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heating, cooking, electricity) and lack options for substitution (Wang et al., 2016; Feng et al., 
2018). Therefore, for China, which is experiencing its transition period and meanwhile facing the 
challenge of regional and urban-rural income disparities, distributional impact is a particularly 
important issue which affects the social equity and justice. Assessing the distributional impact of 
carbon pricing in China can provide useful information for policy makers to help them better 
design the policy.  
Carbon pricing attempts to internalize the external costs of carbon emissions into market 
prices and to provide an incentive to mitigate carbon emissions (Wang et al., 2016). There are 
two main types of carbon pricing: emissions trading systems (ETS) and carbon taxes (CT)(CPL, 
2016). While numerous studies have focused on potential distributional issues of carbon pricing, 
most studies have focused on developed countries (Wang et al., 2016). Although several studies 
show that taxing carbon in certain developed countries/regions may be neutral (Symons et al., 
2000; Creedy and Sleeman, 2006) or weakly progressive (Tiezzi, 2005; Oladosu and Rose, 2007; 
Sajeewani et al., 2015), more studies show that without carbon revenue recycling, a CT policy is 
regressive in most cases (Speck, 1999; Baranzini et al., 2000; Brännlund and Nordström, 2004; 
Wier et al., 2005; Kerkhof et al., 2008; Callan et al., 2009; Feng et al., 2010; Bureau, 2011; IPCC, 
2014; Mathur and Morris, 2014). Regressivity means that the cost of a carbon tax to the income 
or welfare of lower income groups is higher than the higher income groups, or in other words, 
the burden of carbon pricing on the poor is higher than on the rich. A potential regressive effect 
will aggravate inequality of a society (Feng et al., 2010; Büchs and Schnepf, 2013; Dennig et al., 
2015). As for developing countries, there are much fewer studies, some of which show 
regressivity and some do not (Wang et al., 2016). Moreover, these studies show that the design 
on how the CT tax is implemented and how its revenue is recycled, could affect the distributional 
impact of CT (Zhang and Baranzini, 2004; Oladosu and Rose, 2007; Parry, 2015; Wang et al., 
2016). Although research has paid less attention to the distributional effect of carbon emissions 
trading, they generally support the conclusion that ETS has a similar regressive effect as CT 
(Parry, 2004; Burtraw et al., 2009; Shammin and Bullard, 2009). For example, Burtraw et al. 
(2009) argued that through auctioning the emissions allowances and returning the auction 
revenues to households, the adverse distributional impact of ETS could be altered. 
Overall, existing studies on carbon pricing mainly focus on the distributional effect within a 
country or a region, such as across income groups (Callan et al., 2009; Feng et al., 2010; Bureau, 
2011; Mathur and Morris, 2014), between rural and urban households (Callan et al., 2009; 
Bureau, 2011; Pashardes et al., 2014), among households grouped by other demographic 
characteristics (e.g. family size (Wier et al., 2005; Callan et al., 2009) or households’ 
socio-economic status (Feng et al., 2010)), but very few pay attention to the analysis from a 
multi-regional perspective. 
As for China, there are several studies on the distributional impact of a hypothetical carbon 
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price in China, e.g. on China’s urban-rural gap (Liang and Wei, 2012); among different income 
groups (Brenner et al., 2007; Wang, 2009), or on a specific region such as Shanghai (Jiang and 
Shao, 2014). On the whole, studies paying attention to the distributional impact of carbon pricing 
between groups across different regions are lacking, which is exactly the contribution of this 
paper. This study aims to capture the details that a national-level or a single region analysis could 
not obtain, in order to put forward policy recommendations to policymakers on how to mitigate 
potential unintended adverse distributional effects of carbon pricing while maintaining the 
intended emission reduction effect. Given that both CT and ETS mechanisms ripple throughout 
the economic system by increasing the price of fossil fuels, these two carbon pricing polices 
share a a number of similarities in terms of distributional effects, we believe that our analysis 
will hold for both carbon pricing instruments. 
This study, therefore, focuses on analyzing the distributional impact of a certain carbon 
price on the households across different regions, through answering the following 3 research 
questions: (1) How will the carbon pricing impact regional inequality? (2) How will the carbon 
pricing impact rural and urban households within a region? (3) Will carbon pricing enlarge the 
inequality across income groups? 
 
2 Materials and Methods 
Adopting similar approaches used by Wier et al. (2005), Kerkhof et al. (2008), Feng et al. 
(2010), we carry out analysis based on Multi-Regional Input-Output (MRIO ) analysis to assess 
the impact of carbon pricing on households across China’s 30 provinces. Fig. A.2 illustrates the 
research framework of this study. 
2.1 Multi-regional input-output analysis 
Multi-regional input-output (MRIO) analysis is a popular approach for analyzing the 
interactions among regions and sectors and thus can account for the carbon footprint for various 
economic agents (Liu et al., 2015). Therefore, MRIO method has been widely applied in energy 
& environment and ecological system research, with a focus on topics such as carbon emission 
accounting and decomposition analysis of driving factors (Guan et al., 2008; Su et al., 2013; Liu 
et al., 2015; Fan et al., 2016), virtual water flows (Lenzen et al., 2013; Feng et al., 2014), land 
use (Weinzettel et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2013), toxins (Koh et al., 2016), and a wide range of other 
environmental indicators.  
The MRIO model is an extension from the standard IO model to a larger economy that 
includes each industry in each country or region possessing a separate row and column. The 
basic equation of the IO model is shown in Eq. 1 
 +  = AX Y X                                   (1) 
where (in a n-sector economy): 
X ~ total output vector with n dimensions whose element Xi is the output of sector i; 
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Y ~ final demand vector with n dimensions whose element Yi denotes final demand 
(including household and government consumption, investment, and exports) for goods i; 
A ~ direct requirements matrix (or technology matrix) with n*n dimensions whose element 
aij represent the direct requirements of sector j on sector i per unit output of sector j. 
For MRIO model, Eq. (1) could be rewritten as Eq. (2): 
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 is a column vector with m 
dimensions whose element rviy  denotes the sum of final demand of all items (including 
household and government consumption, investment, and exports)
3
 for commodity i in region v 
from region r.  
Equations (3) can be obtained from Eq. (2). 
  
-1
= - =X  I A Y LY                             (3) 
where, 
                                                             
3 Actually, when computing the result, this study disaggregate the final demand into household consumption, 
government consumption, investment, and exports; and the household consumption of each region can be further 
disaggregated into rural households and urban households consumption; moreover, the consumption expenditures 
of each rural households and urban households can be divided into different income brackets.   
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I ~ m*n dimension identity matrix; 
 
1
 = 

L I - A   ~ m*n dimension Leontief inverse matrix or total requirements matrix 
whose element rnijl  represents the total volume of commodity i in region r required both directly 
and indirectly to produce one unit of final demand of commodity j in region n. 
As shown in Eq. (4), total requirements matrix can be decomposed into three parts: I, A and 
2 3 n  A A A . Of them, I denotes the unit final use produced by the m*n production 
sectors; A denotes the direct requirements matrix used by producing the unit final use; 
2 3 n  A A A  denotes the total indirect requirements matrix used by producing the unit 
final use. Therefore, Eq. (4) can comprehensively reflect the change in the total output of this 
sector and other sectors directly and indirectly induced by the change in the final demand of any 
sectors (Liang, 2007). 
1 2 3( ) n       L I A I A A A A                   (4) 
2.2 Direct and indirect effects from pricing carbon  
Through charging CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion by households and industries, 
carbon pricing can reduce fossil fuel consumption and related emissions. The aim of this study is 
to measure and compare the impact of carbon pricing on households among different regions, so 
we focus only on households. Direct effects refers to charging direct emissions produced by 
households such as cooking, heating and driving; indirect effects refer to charging indirect 
emissions arising throughout the production steps required to produce households’ final 
consumption items. Given that pricing carbon on fossil fuel consumption will lead to different 
prices of products, and different consumers have different consumption structures, the final tax 
burden may be unevenly distributed (Wang, 2009). Therefore, it is necessary to undertake a 
comparative analysis on the carbon pricing burden of different household groups between and 
within regions. 
Consistent with existing studies (Wier et al., 2005; Kerkhof et al., 2008; Feng et al., 2010, 
2018), this study also assumes that the carbon pricing burden imposed on production sectors can 
be fully passed onto the consumers, therefore, households bear both the direct and indirect 
impact by the carbon pricing. This approach ignores demand elasticities and substitution 
possibilities, which is a common shortcoming of these type of studies. The IO method can 
calculate the indirect emissions driven by final demand thus captures the indirect effect of carbon 
pricing. In this study, given our interest in impacts on households, we only focus on household 
consumption.  
The total carbon payment of consumption category k is the sum of direct and indirect 
carbon payments.  
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_ _k k kCT CT d CT nd                               (5) 
Where, _ kCT d , _ kCT nd  and kCT  represent the direct, indirect, and total carbon 
(pricing) payment on consumption category k, respectively. When setting the carbon price as t 
Yuan/t CO2, kCT  can be obtained through Eq. (6). 
( _ _ )k k kCT E d E nd t                              (6) 
Where, _ kE d , _ kE nd  denote the direct and indirect emissions due to the consumption 
on category k, respectively. Then production emissions coefficient Ck can be calculated by 
dividing the direct emissions of sector k by its total output.  
Then, for the MRIO model, the indirect emissions coefficient matrix driven by final 
consumption is CL, where
11
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, and submatrix rrC  is a m by m diagonal 
matrix whose element rriiC  denotes the production emissions coefficient of sector i in region r. 
The indirect emissions vector driven by household h in region v can be obtained through Eq. 7: 
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And the total indirect emissions driven by household h in region v can be obtained by Eq. 8:  
1 1
_ _
n m
v rv
h ih
r i
E nd E nd
 
                             (8) 
2.3 Selection of indicators 
To answer the three questions mentioned in the introduction section, two types of indicators 
are selected in this study. One category is used to measure how heavy the carbon pricing burden 
is: 1) absolute value of per capita carbon payment and 2) the per capita carbon payment burden 
rate. The per capita carbon payment is the average cost per person paid for his/her own carbon 
emissions. And, the per capita carbon pricing burden rate refers to the percentage of per capita 
carbon payment in the per capita expenditure which is the sum of the pre-tax per capita 
expenditure and the per capita total carbon payment. The second category indicates if the carbon 
pricing will exacerbate the regional imbalance. Here we choose the Suits index (Suits, 1977) to 
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measure the distributional effect of carbon pricing.   
The Suits index has been widely used to measure the distributional effect of a tax or public 
expenditure, including environmental taxes (Metcalf, 1999), vehicle pollution control policies 
(West, 2004), gasoline taxes (Agostini and Jiménez, 2015), and carbon taxes (Wier et al., 2005; 
Jiang and Shao, 2014). The index ranges from +1, i.e. extreme progressivity, where the entire tax 
burden is borne by members of the highest income bracket, through 0 for a proportional tax, to – 
1, which refers to extreme regressivity, at which the entire tax burden is borne by members of the 
lowest income bracket (Suits, 1977).  
The calculation of Suits index is based on the idea of the Gini coefficient and the Lorenz 
curve (referred to as concentration curve by Suits). Fig. 1 shows an example of the concentration 
curve. The horizontal axis represents the accumulated percent of the income and the accumulated 
percent of the tax burden is plotted vertically. The population is ranked by income from low to 
high.  
 
Fig.1 The schematic diagram of the Suits index 
Following Suits (1977), the Suits index (S) can be calculated through Eq. 9:  
       /   1  /S K L K L K   
                     (9) 
Where K is the area of the triangle OAB in Fig. 1, L is the area OABC between the curve and the 
horizontal axis OA. And L can be obtained through Eq. 10.   
1
0
1 1
1
( )
(1/ 2)[ ( ) ( )]( )
n
i i i i
i
L T r dr
T r T r r r 


  


                  (10) 
Where ri denotes the accumulated percent of income of the i
th
 group, measured on the 
horizontal axis, which ranges from 0 to 1; T(ri) is the corresponding accumulated percent of the 
tax burden borne by the i
th
 group, and n stands for the number of households’ income groups. 
For 0 0r  , 0( ) 0T r  , K=1/2, the Suits index can be approximately obtained through Eq. 11. 
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2.4 Data source and data processing 
The data source for this study is China’s MRIO table for 2012 with 42 sectors in 30 provinces 
(excluding Tibet). Emissions data are taken from the China’s provincial and national emissions 
inventory for 2012 provided by China Emission Accounts and Datasets (CEADs)
4
. In this study, 
we only focus on the CO2 emissions associated with fossil fuels, thus the process emissions (e.g. 
emissions from cement production) are not included. Population data are taken from the China 
Statistical Yearbook 2013 (NBS, 2013).  
Data processing for production emissions coefficients: CEADs emissions data includes 45 
sectors while the sector number of MRIO is 42. Su et al. (2010) summarized two data treatment 
schemes to make the sector numbers between emissions coefficient and the Leontief inverse 
matrix compatible. The first is to aggregate the finer IO data to the level that matches the energy 
consumption data, while the other is to disaggregate the energy consumption data to the level that 
matches the IO data. We used both approaches to match the datasets and calculate production 
emissions intensity coefficients for 42 sectors in each of 30 provinces in China for the year 2012. 
The concordance matrix linking the datasets  is shown in Appendix Table A.1. 
Disaggregation of different income groups within provinces: In order to capture the 
differences of carbon pricing burden between different household groups, we need to further 
disaggregate urban and rural households in 30 provinces of MRIO to the level of different 
income groups. The per capita annual consumption expenditure survey data for different urban 
and rural income groups in each province are taken from China provincial statistical yearbook 
2013 for 30 provinces. The relationship between household consumption expenditure items and 
products of MRIO sectors is shown in Appendix Table A.2.  
Since some provinces do not provide detailed data on households’ expenditure at the level 
of income groups, we also illustrate the data availability in Fig.2
5
. Specifically, the area marked 
by star indicates that the data are available for both rural and urban income groups in that 
province; areas marked with triangle denote that only the data on urban income groups are 
available; and the provinces with cross label represent that data are unavailable for both rural and 
urban income groups. In addition, there are also some regions, such as Tibet, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Macau, which are not discussed in this study due to data limitations. Finally, 12 
provinces with star label (Beijing, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Henan, Jiangxi, 
Guangdong, Fujian, Guangxi, Chongqing, Gansu) are divided into different income groups 
within both rural and urban areas, while another 12 provinces marked with triangle (Tianjin, Jilin, 
                                                             
4 China Emission Accounts and Datasets (CEADs): http://www.ceads.net/data/inventory-by-sectoral-approach/. 
5 Taking into account the possible similarity between neighboring provinces, we aggregate the 30 provinces in 
Fig.2 to eight regions according to geographical characteristics. 
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Liaoning, Anhui, Hubei, Hainan, Sichuan, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang) 
are divided into different income groups only within the urban.  
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Fig. 2 Eight economic regions in mainland China 
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2.5 Carbon pricing schemes 
According to a preliminary estimates of the National Development and Reform 
Commission, in the long run, a carbon price of 300 Yuan /t CO2 is regarded as a price standard 
which can play a role in leading the low-carbon green development
6
. From the experience of 
China’s 7 pilot carbon markets, the average carbon price ranges from 10 to 50 Yuan /t CO2
7
. 
Considering that a higher carbon price might lead to a heavier economic burden to industries and 
households, some studies suggest a lower rate ranging from 10~20 Yuan/t CO2 (Su et al., 2011; 
Jiang and Shao, 2014). As a compromise (but not as a suggestion), we set the carbon price at 50 
Yuan /t CO2, and added a low carbon price scenario at 10 Yuan /t CO2 and a high carbon price 
scenario at 100 Yuan /t CO2 to construct a sensitivity analysis.  
In this paper, all carbon pricing revenues are not recycled back to the economy, which also 
means that no social protection measures are considered.  
2.6 Limitations 
This study estimates the short-term distributional impacts of carbon pricing from an 
expenditure-side perspective, which means that the income changes of households due to the 
carbon pricing are not modeled; meanwhile, as mentioned in Feng et al. (2010), the behavioral 
response of consumers to higher prices and the associated changes in production are not 
considered within the current IO model framework. In fact, carbon pricing will affect household 
income through affecting the input of production factors and thereby the factor incomes such as 
wages and returns to capital (Feng et al. 2010; Liang and Wei, 2012; Liang et al., 2013). 
Meanwhile, in the long run, the production structure and production technology will change 
significantly, but these can be simulated only by more complicated models like computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) models. However, production structures and consumption patterns 
can be rather inflexible in the short run and thus the input-output approach provides a useful first 
approximation of short-run impacts and can put forward helpful information for policy makers 
on the fairness of carbon pricing mechanisms, and allows to model and develop different 
measures to mitigate the regional regressivity of carbon pricing. 
 
3 Results  
3.1 Comparison of household’s carbon burden for 30 provinces in China  
If the implementation of carbon pricing mechanism makes the less developed regions (with 
low per capita GDP) bear a higher carbon burden than those developed regions (with high per 
capita GDP), we define carbon pricing as regressive. Fig. 3 shows the carbon payment burden 
rate of residents in China’s 30 provinces.  
                                                             
6 Economic Information Daily. The construction of the carbon market trading system enters the sprint period. 
2017-10-30. Available from: http://www.jjckb.cn/2016-10/31/c_135792422.htm 
7 China Carbon Emissions Trading Network. 2018-1-30. Available from: http://www.tanpaifang.com/ 
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From Fig. 3 we can see that a carbon price of 50 Yuan/t CO2 will bring an average per 
capita carbon payment burden rate of 0.67% to the households in China’s 30 provinces, which 
is not heavy as a whole but shows significant differences across the provinces. Beijing would 
bear the lowest carbon burden rate (0.5%), followed by Fujian and Shanghai; while the three 
provinces with the highest burden rate are Inner Mongolia (1.38%), Qinghai (1.34%) and 
Heilongjiang (1.02%). The developed eastern areas, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, 
Fujian and Zhejiang, generally bear a lower carbon burden; central regions like Henan, Hubei, 
Hunan and Anhui bear a burden rate which is close to the national average level, while the 
carbon burden rates of the economically underdeveloped areas, including the southwest and 
northwest regions, are relatively high. In other words, the carbon pricing is regressive across 
provinces.  
 
Fig. 3 Carbon burden rate among China’s 30 provinces.  
Per capita carbon burden rate is calculated by dividing the per capita carbon payments by per capita 
consumption expenditure. 30 provinces are ranked by per capita carbon payment from high to low on 
the horizontal axis. 
Fig. 3 shows that the average per capita carbon payment is 95.8 Yuan. Generally, the per 
capita carbon payment in most provinces increases with per capita consumption with some 
noteworthy exceptions. For example, Qinghai has the lowest per capita expenditure, which is 
only 56% of the national average, but its per capita carbon payment is 17% higher than the 
national average. Inner Mongolia’s per capita consumption is close to the national average, but 
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its per capita carbon payment is 2.1 times the national average level, which is close to Shanghai’s 
per capita carbon payment level. As a result, the carbon burden rate of these two provinces is 
significantly higher than that of other provinces. Shanghai’s and Beijing’s per capita carbon 
payments are relatively high with 2.1 and 1.6 times the national average level, respectively. But 
due to their higher per capita consumption level, which is 1.6 and 1 times higher than the 
national average, their per capita carbon burden rate becomes the lowest.   
Fig. 3 also shows that the characteristics of indirect per capita carbon payments for China’s 
provinces are similar to the total per capita carbon payment, and also plays a dominant role in the 
total per capita carbon payment. Their proportions range from 74% to 91%. Furthermore, the 
direct per capita carbon payment is relatively stable across the provinces and does not show a 
close correlation with per capita consumption levels. Therefore, compared with the indirect per 
capita carbon payment, the direct payment is more regressive. 
We analyze the differences in the carbon burden rate between provinces through 
decomposing its structure as shown in Fig.4. for 8 major categories of consumer goods. The top 
three contributors are Residence (which includes water, electricity, fuels and housing as shown 
in Table A.2), Transportation & Communication and Food, which account for about two-thirds 
of the total per capita carbon burden rate. In particular, for those provinces with a higher carbon 
burden, such as Inner Mongolia, Qinghai and Heilongjiang, Residence accounts for 51.4%, 
64.9% and 48.6% carbon burden rate, respectively. However, for those with low carbon burden 
rates, such as Beijing, Fujian and Shanghai, the contribution of Residence to the total carbon 
burden rate is only 19.4%, 28.2% and 21.8%, respectively. Therefore, Residence is the most 
important contributor to the regional regressivity of carbon pricing. Moreover, by further 
analyzing the structure of Residence category, as shown in Fig.A.3, we find that electricity 
consumption plays a dominant role in most provinces, followed by coal and gas consumption.  
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Fig.4 Per capita carbon payment burden rate by consumption categories of goods and services 
 
3.2 Distribution of carbon burden between rural and urban households within each 
province 
There is a large income gap between China’s urban and rural residents. In general, the 
income and expenditure level of urban residents is larger than that of rural residents. If the 
implementation of carbon pricing mechanism will make rural residents bear a higher carbon 
burden than urban residents, the carbon pricing is regressive, which can be called rural-urban 
regressive here, and vice versa. Similarly, if carbon pricing makes the lower income groups 
shoulder heavier than the higher income groups, the carbon pricing is regressive across income 
groups. 
We calculated the per capita direct, indirect and total carbon burden for both urban and rural 
households in each of the 30 provinces. And the per capita total carbon burden rate is the sum of 
per capita direct carbon burden rate and per capita indirect carbon burden rate. To highlight the 
rural- urban differences, we further calculate the relative gap in carbon burden between the urban 
and rural households in each province, as shown in Fig. 5. 
Fig.5a shows the rural-urban relative gap caused by the total carbon pricing. We can see that 
the carbon pricing are rural-urban regressive in more than half of the 30 provinces whereas a 
handful of provinces show relatively weak rural-urban progressivity.  
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Fig. 5 The rural-urban relative gap in carbon burden rate in each of 30 provinces. (a) Total carbon pricing; (b) 
Direct carbon pricing; (c) Indirect carbon pricing. (Notes: The rural-urban relative gap is obtained through dividing 
the per capita burden rate of rural households by that of urban households and minus one, thus a positive value 
means that the carbon pricing is rural-urban regressive.) 
The direct carbon pricing causes rural-urban regressivity to 23 of the 30 provinces (see Fig. 
5b). And the regressivity is much stronger than that of the total carbon pricing and the indirect 
carbon pricing. Through analyzing the three components of direct carbon pricing (coal, 
petroleum and gas), we find that the carbon payment due to coal consumption show obvious 
rural-urban regressivity in almost all provinces, which is the main reason for the strong 
rural-urban regressivity of the direct carbon pricing. Unlike the direct carbon pricing, as shown 
in Fig.5c, the indirect carbon payment brings relatively weak rural-urban progressivity to 20 
provinces while causes rural-urban regressivity to the remaining 10 provinces.  
3.3 Inequality of carbon tax payment  
This section chooses the Suits index (see Eq. 11) to measure the distributional effects of 
carbon pricing, in order to accurately reflect whether the carbon pricing will exacerbate China’s 
regional imbalance and how serious it is. Table 1 shows the Suits index of carbon pricing in rural, 
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urban and total households among 30 provinces. We calculate the Suits index to represent the 
direct, indirect and total distributional effects of carbon pricing, respectively. 
Table 1 the Suits index of carbon pricing 
Suits index Direct carbon payment Indirect carbon payment Total carbon payment 
Rural -0.130 -0.024 -0.049 
Urban -0.132 -0.066 -0.075 
National total -0.210 -0.032 -0.060 
Note: The national total here only contains the 30 provinces observed in this study. 
 
As shown in Table 1, pricing carbon on fossil energy consumption at a price of 50 Yuan/t 
CO2 will have a regressive distributional effect to rural, urban and national total households 
across 30 provinces. Among them, the direct carbon payment, namely, the payment due to 
households’ direct carbon emissions, has a stronger regressive effect in the rural, urban and the 
total households, with the regressivity in the national total being the strongest. The indirect 
carbon payment, which can be understood as the cost of carbon pricing transferred from the 
production sectors, shows a relatively weak regressivity.  
Overall, the direct carbon pricing has the most obvious regressivity, while the indirect 
carbon pricing has a relatively weak regressivity, and in total, the carbon pricing has a weak 
regressivity. Moreover, the extent of regressivity for urban is somewhat stronger than for rural 
households, and the regressivity within the national total households is between the extent for 
rural and urban, with an exception that the national Suits index of the direct carbon payment 
shows the most significant regressivity. 
3.4 Comparison of carbon burden among different income groups within each province  
This section wants to further explore whether the carbon pricing will have an uneven 
distributional effect among different income groups within each province. As mentioned in 
section 2.4, due to data limitation, only 12 provinces are divided into different income groups 
within both rural and urban areas, while another 12 provinces are disaggregated only within the 
urban (see Fig. 2). 
And Fig.6 presents the carbon burden rate of different income groups within these 
provinces.  
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Fig.6 Per capita carbon burden rate of different income groups in each province  
(Notes: R1, R2, R3, R4, R5 denote different income groups of rural households from low income level to high; U1, U2, U3, U4, U5, U6, U7 represent different income groups of urban 
households from low income level to high.) 
Per capita indirect carbon burden rate           Per capita direct carbon burden rate 
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Fig.6 shows that, overall, the distributional effect of uniform national carbon pricing within 
urban areas in most provinces (and also within a few provinces’ rural areas) would exacerbate 
income disparity in these areas. But, some areas show progressive distributional effects in that 
carbon pricing burden increases with the income level, such as rural Shanghai, Fujian and 
Guangxi, and urban Hainan and Sichuan, as well as urban and rural Jiangxi. Finally, although the 
carbon burden rate of a national uniform carbon price is distributed unevenly across different 
income groups in each area, this difference is relatively small compared with the gap between 
provinces or the gap between rural and urban households in each province. 
In order to obtain an accurate distributional effect of carbon pricing, we calculate the Suits 
index in each region, as shown in Table A.3. Fig.2 classifies the observed 24 provinces into 7 
regions, thus Table A.3 can provide results about distributional impacts of carbon pricing from 
both provincial and regional levels. 
For most provinces, carbon pricing has regressive distributional effects both across different 
urban-rural income groups (see overall Suits index) and within urban groups themselves. While, it 
shows weak progressivity in two-thirds of the 12 selected rural areas. In addition, direct carbon 
payment shows much stronger regressivity than the indirect carbon payment, as a result, the total 
carbon payment shows less regressivity in most provinces.  
We further categorize direct energy consumption into domestic fuels (coal and gas) and 
transport fuels (petroleum) according to the purpose of energy use, and calculate the Suits index of 
carbon pricing on domestic fuels and on transportation fuels, respectively, as shown in the first 
two columns of Table A.3. The carbon payment due to domestic fuels shows regressivity, while 
the carbon payment on transport fuels shows progressivity, independent of urban-rural status.  
3.5 Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, sensitivity analyses are performed by setting the carbon price at 10 and 100 
Yuan/t CO2, respectively. As shown in Fig. 7, the average per capita carbon burden rate caused by 
carbon prices of 10, 50 and 100 Yuan/t CO2 are 0.134%, 0.667% and 1.324%, respectively. Since 
the carbon payment under the carbon prices 10~100 are all much lower than the level of the 
pre-tax per capita expenditure, the obtained carbon burden rate almost shows proportional increase 
with the prices ranging from 10 to 100 Yuan/t CO2. In addition, we also find that the ranking of 30 
provinces by the per capita carbon burden rate does not change with the increase of the carbon 
price.  
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Fig. 7 Provincial carbon burden rates for different carbon prices 
 
Furthermore, we also compare the rural-urban distributional effects under different carbon 
prices (10 and 100 yuan) and calculate their corresponding Suits index. Results show that no 
directional changes occur in distributional impacts independent of province and income group. 
Moreover, the absolute value of Suits index will decrease very slightly with an increase of carbon 
price. This result is directly related to our assumption that consumer behavior does not change 
immediately after the introduction of the carbon pricing policy. This hypothesis is strong in the 
long term, but it is acceptable in assessing the potential short-term impact of carbon pricing.  
 
4 Conclusions and policy implications 
This study employed the MRIO model to analyze the regional distributional impact of a 
national uniform carbon price in China. Based on our results we can draw several conclusions:   
First, carbon pricing effects are different across provinces. The average carbon burden rate 
caused by a carbon price of 50 Yuan/t CO2 is 0.67%, which is not heavy as a whole but is unevenly 
distributed across provinces. Richer provinces such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong bear a 
lower carbon pricing burden than the poorer provinces in Western China. Meanwhile, residence 
category contributes most to the regressivity of carbon pricing, and electricity and coal constitute 
the main parts to direct household expenditure for heating and cooling and similar items. This 
emphasizes the need to put high importance on the optimization of the energy and electricity 
structure, and to a reduction of coal use, especially by households. 
Second, carbon pricing shows rural-urban regressivity in more than half of the 30 provinces, 
which indicates that a national uniform carbon price would widen the rural-urban gap in these 
provinces. In other provinces, the carbon pricing show weak rural-urban progressivity or 
approximately proportional distributional effect between rural and urban. This shows us the rural 
households (especially rural low income groups which are lacking the discourse power) are the 
most vulnerable groups to the potential negative impact of carbon pricing, and thus need to be paid 
special attention to. 
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Third, the direct effect of carbon prices shows a relatively strong regressivity for all 
household categories and provinces, while the indirect effects shows relatively weak regressivity. 
In total, the carbon pricing has weak regressivity for all household types and provinces.  
Fourth, the carbon pricing has regressive distributional effects across different income groups 
within urban households of most provinces; while for rural income groups, it is weakly 
progressive in two-thirds of the 12 selected rural areas. In addition, the distributional impact of 
direct carbon payments is regressive in most provinces, and the extent of such regressivity is 
stronger than that of the indirect carbon payment and total carbon payment.  
Last, when categorizing the direct energy consumption into domestic fuels (coal and gas) and 
transport fuels (petroleum), in general, the carbon pricing on domestic fuels shows regressivity, 
while pricing carbon on transport fuels shows progressivity, for all households and provinces. This 
result reminds policymakers that different carbon pricing policies should be designed between 
domestic fuels and transport fuels. Households are very small emission sources, which are not 
included in the carbon market system at present. Once a carbon tax is considered for all emission 
sources that are not covered by the carbon market, we recommend households’ transportation fuels 
rather than domestic fuels could be taxed first. If domestic fuels are also to be taxed for 
households, extra measures for vulnerable low income groups should be taken to avoid its 
potential regressive effects. 
Results of this study show that carbon pricing may increase the rural-urban gap, the 
provincial gap and the inequality within provinces, but overall, such a regressive distributional 
impact is not strong. From the experience of China’s 7 carbon market pilots, we can see that the 
overall current carbon price is still at a rather low level ranges from 10 to 50 Yuan /t CO2, which 
has not created an onerous impact on economy and living standards. However, with higher future 
carbon prices, the burden caused might create social hardship for lower income groups and rural 
households. 
Given that the current regional imbalance and income disparity have already been very large, 
adequate attention should be paid to even a small regressive policy. Based on our results, we 
suggest that when China gradually establishes more comprehensive carbon markets and higher 
prices, measures need to be taken to mitigate potential regressive distributional impacts. For 
example, the most practical way might be recycling the carbon pricing revenues to 
vulnerable/low-income households of the most affected areas, or to set differential tax rates for 
provinces. 
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Fig. A.1 Per capita GDP of 31 provinces in China for 2017 
(Data source: China Statistical Yearbook 2018(NBS, 2018)) 
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Fig. A.2 Research framework 
 
 
 
Table A.1 The relationship between the sectors of provincial-level CO2 emission inventory from 
CEADs and the sectors of MRIO table 
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Sectors of Provincial-level CO2 emission inventory 
from CEADs 
Sectors of MRIO table 
Code Sector name Sector name Code 
1 
Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, 
Fishery and Water Conservancy       Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, 
Fishery Products and Services 
1 
8 Logging and Transport of Wood and Bamboo                  
2 Coal Mining and Dressing                                  Coal Mining and Dressing Products 2 
3 Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction                      
Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction 
Products 
3 
4 Ferrous Metals Mining and Dressing                        
Metals Mining and Dressing Products 
4 
5 Nonferrous Metals Mining and Dressing                     
6 Nonmetal Minerals Mining and Dressing                     Nonmetal Minerals and Other Minerals 
Mining and Dressing Products 
5 
7 Other Minerals Mining and Dressing                        
9 Food Processing                                           Food and Tobacco   6 
10 Food Production                                           
11 Beverage Production 
12 Tobacco Processing                                        
13 Textile Industry                                          Textile  7 
14 Garments and Other Fiber Products                         Garments and Other Fiber Products                         
Leather, Furs, Down and Related 
Products                  
8 
15 Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products                  
16 
Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane, Palm 
Fiber & Straw Products 
Wood Processing products and 
Furniture  
9 
17 Furniture Manufacturing                                   
18 Papermaking and Paper Products                            
Papermaking, Printing, Cultural, 
Educational and Sports Articles  
10 
19 Printing and Record Medium Reproduction                   
20 Cultural, Educational and Sports Articles                 
21 Petroleum Processing and Coking                           
Petroleum Processing and Coking 
Products 
11 
22 
Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical 
Products              
Chemical Products 12 
23 Medical and Pharmaceutical Products                       
24 Chemical Fiber                                            
25 Rubber Products                                           
26 Plastic Products                                          
27 Nonmetal Mineral Products                                 Nonmetal Mineral Products 13 
28 Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals                   
Smelting and Pressing of Metals 
14 
29 Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous Metals                
30 Metal Products                                            Metal Products   15 
31 Ordinary Machinery                                        Ordinary Machinery                                        16 
32 Equipment for Special Purposes                            Equipment for Special Purposes                            17 
33 Transportation Equipment                                  Transportation Equipment                                  18
34 Electric Equipment and Machinery                          Electric Equipment and Machinery                          19
35 
Electronic and Telecommunications 
Equipment               
Electronic and Telecommunications 
Equipment               
20 
36 
Instruments, Meters, Cultural and Office 
Machinery          
Instruments, Meters, Cultural and 
Office Machinery          
21 
37 Other Manufacturing Industry                              
Other Manufacturing Industry; 
Services for Metal Products, 
Machinery and Equipment   
22, 
24 
38 Scrap and Waste Scrap and Waste 23 
39 
Production and Supply of Electric Power, 
Steam and Hot Water    
Production and Supply of Electric 
Power, Steam and Hot Water 
25 
40 Production and Supply of Gas                              Production and Supply of Gas                              26
41 Production and Supply of Tap Water                        Production and Supply of Tap Water                        27 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
42 Construction                                              Construction                                              28 
43 
Transportation, Storage, Post and 
Telecommunication Services     
Transportation, Storage and Post 30 
44 
Wholesale, Retail Trade and Catering 
Services             
Wholesale, Retail Trade 29 
Accommodation and Catering Services             31 
45 Others                                                    
Information Transmission, Software 
and Information Technology Services 
32 
Finance 33 
Real Estate 34 
Leasing and Commercial Services 35 
Scientific Research and Technical 
Services 
36 
Water Conservancy, Environment and 
Public Facilities Management 
37 
Resident Services, Repairs and Other 
Services 
38 
Education 39 
Health and Social Work 40 
Culture, Sports and Entertainment 41 
Public Management, Social security 
and Social Organizations 
42 
 
 
Table A.2 The relationship between household consumption expenditure items and the sectors of 
MRIO table 
Expenditure items Sectors of MRIO table 
Food 1, 6 
Clothing 7-8 
Household Facilities, Articles and Services 9, 15-17, 19, 21 
Transportation & Communication and 
Food 
11, 18, 20, 30, 32  
Chemical & Medicine 12, 40 
Recreation, Education and Cultural 
Services 
10, 39, 41 
Residence 2, 13, 25-28, 34-35 
Water, electricity and fuels 2, 25-28,  
Housing 13, 34-35 
Other Goods & Services 22, 24, 29, 33, 36-38, 42 
Accommodation and Catering Services 31 
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Fig.A.3 Structure of carbon burden rate on Residence category by 30 provinces  
 
Table A.3 Suits index of carbon pricing 
Regions Provinces Suits index 
Energy domain 
Direct carbon 
payment 
Indirect carbon 
payment 
Total carbon 
payment Transport 
fuels 
Domestic 
fuels 
Jing-Jin 
(JJ) 
Beijing 
Rural 0.0982 -0.0297 -0.0209 0.0260 0.0019 
Urban 0.0640 -0.2504 -0.0409 -0.0158 -0.0208 
Overall 0.0985 -0.5033 -0.1909 -0.0101 -0.0523 
Tianjin Urban 0.0911 -0.1695 0.0345 -0.0392 -0.0286 
Northeast 
(NE) 
Heilongjiang 
Rural 0.0556 -0.0202 0.0117 -0.0020 0.0002 
Urban 0.2759 -0.3384 -0.0875 -0.0363 -0.0455 
Overall 0.2222 -0.1556 -0.0003 0.0078 0.0063 
Jilin Urban 0.2493 -0.1197 0.0428 -0.0436 -0.0333 
Liaoning Urban 0.3109 -0.1276 0.0106 -0.0109 -0.0085 
Eastern 
Coastal 
(EC) 
Shanghai 
Rural 0.0526 0.0415 0.0470 0.0134 0.0244 
Urban 0.0062 -0.1661 -0.0567 -0.0151 -0.0188 
Overall -0.1414 -0.3429 -0.2233 -0.0171 -0.0407 
Zhejiang 
Rural 0.0704 -0.1087 -0.0385 0.0023 -0.0052 
Urban 0.0691 -0.2720 -0.1502 -0.0279 -0.0381 
Overall -0.1459 -0.3300 -0.2614 -0.0359 -0.0607 
Jiangsu 
Rural 0.0435 -0.0068 0.0258 -0.0024 -0.0010 
Urban 0.0430 -0.1460 -0.0200 -0.0154 -0.0158 
Overall 0.1026 -0.0612 0.0475 -0.0217 -0.0157 
Central 
Region 
(CR) 
Henan 
Rural 0.0872 0.0143 0.0214 0.0023 0.0080 
Urban 0.1582 -0.2281 -0.1345 -0.0354 -0.0465 
Overall 0.0426 -0.3534 -0.2911 0.0114 -0.0421 
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Jiangxi 
Rural 0.1052 0.0596 0.0740 0.0151 0.0232 
Urban 0.3144 -0.0216 0.1067 0.0185 0.0261 
Overall 0.0851 -0.1384 -0.0598 0.0098 0.0026 
Anhui Urban 0.2011 -0.1369 -0.0339 -0.0371 -0.0367 
Hubei Urban 0.1949 -0.1181 -0.0150 -0.0070 -0.0079 
Southern 
Coastal  
(EC) 
Guangdong 
Rural 0.0129 -0.1431 -0.0776 0.0027 -0.0191 
Urban 0.1035 -0.1494 -0.0498 -0.0145 -0.0181 
Overall -0.1223 -0.2632 -0.2065 0.0027 -0.0243 
Fujian 
Rural 0.0621 0.0374 0.0465 0.0034 0.0098 
Urban 0.1088 -0.1988 -0.0537 -0.0374 -0.0386 
Overall -0.0096 -0.2517 -0.1476 -0.0118 -0.0243 
Hainan Urban 0.1692 -0.0006 0.0933 0.0046 0.0137 
Southwest 
(SW) 
Guangxi 
Rural 0.0755 0.0948 0.0827 0.0155 0.0215 
Urban 0.2095 -0.2414 -0.0755 -0.0122 -0.0206 
Overall 0.0892 -0.0125 0.0307 -0.0107 -0.0057 
Chongqing 
Rural 0.0666 0.0388 0.0436 0.0048 0.0158 
Urban 0.0749 -0.0940 -0.0614 -0.0204 -0.0256 
Overall -0.1178 -0.2358 -0.2139 -0.0020 -0.0361 
Sichuan Urban 0.3035 0.0061 0.0651 0.0299 0.0382 
Northwest 
(NW) 
  
Gansu 
Rural 0.0248 -0.0081 -0.0078 -0.0019 -0.0042 
Urban 0.0872 -0.1329 -0.1141 -0.0459 -0.0527 
Overall 0.1698 -0.3482 -0.3326 0.0166 -0.0588 
Shaanxi Urban 0.1199 -0.2565 -0.1576 -0.0318 -0.0516 
InnerMongolia Urban 0.0682 -0.0778 -0.0742 -0.0245 -0.0362 
Qinghai Urban 0.1423 -0.1170 -0.0973 -0.0499 -0.0578 
Ningxia Urban 0.1300 -0.0346 0.0046 0.0050 0.0050 
Xinjiang Urban 0.0697 -0.2201 -0.1650 -0.0428 -0.0546 
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 This study analyzes the distributional impact of carbon pricing on the 
household groups across Chinese province. 
 Households in poor region may face higher per capita burden rate from 
carbon pricing. 
 Rural household is likely to bear with higher cost rate of carbon pricing to 
their total consumption. 
 However, pricing carbon on transport fuels shows progressivity across income groups in 
both urban and rural areas. 
 Policy maker may consider to recycle the carbon revenue to support vulnerable low 
income household. 
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